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Abstract
A strictly strategy-proof mechanism is one that asks agents to use
strictly dominant strategies. In the canonical one-dimensional mech-
anism design setting with private values, we show that strict strategy-
proofness is equivalent to strict monotonicity plus the envelope formula,
echoing a well-known characterisation of (weak) strategy-proofness.
A consequence is that strategy-proofness can be made strict by an
arbitrarily small modification, so that strictness is ‘essentially for free’.
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1 Introduction
Two popular notions of robustness in mechanism design are strategy-proofness
and full implementation. The former requires that agents use weakly dominant
strategies; the latter that every equilibrium leads to the desired outcome.
In applications, it is common to have the one without the other. Consider
the canonical auction setting with valuations independently distributed
on compact supports. The first-price auction has a unique Bayes–Nash
equilibrium implementing the efficient allocation,1 but agents’ strategies are
not weakly dominant. The second-price auction has an efficient equilibrium in
weakly dominant strategies, but also has many other, inefficient, equilibria.2
∗We are grateful to Yi-Chun Chen, Eddie Dekel, Jeff Ely, Piero Gottardi, Matt Jackson,
Bart Lipman, Alessandro Pavan, Marciano Siniscalchi and Asher Wolinsky for helpful
comments.
1Under mild distributional assumptions. See e.g. Lebrun (2006).
2For example: agent 1 always bids strictly above the supports of all agents’ valuations,
and all other agents always bid zero.
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A sufficient condition for both kinds of robustness is strict strategy-
proofness: agents use strictly dominant strategies. Weak strategy-proofness
obviously follows, and full implementation follows because a game can have
at most one strictly dominant strategy profile.
In this note, we study strict strategy-proofness in a canonical one-
dimensional mechanism design setting with private values and quasi-linear
and strictly single-crossing preferences. It is well-known that weak strategy-
proofness is equivalent to monotonicity plus the envelope formula; we show
in §3 that strict strategy-proofness is equivalent strict monotonicity plus the
envelope formula.
In §4, we derive the implication that any weakly strategy-proof mechanism
is virtually strictly strategy-proof, meaning that it can be made strictly
strategy-proof by an arbitrarily small modification. This can be viewed as a
novel robustness property of weak strategy-proofness. It follows further that
a principal designing a weakly strategy-proof mechanism can achieve strict
strategy-proofness at arbitrarily small cost.
2 Environment
There is a principal and n agents. The principal chooses a physical outcome
xi ∈ [0, 1] and a payment pi ∈ R for each agent i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.3 We neglect
for now any feasibility constraints that (x1, . . . , xn) must satisfy.
Agent i’s payoff has the quasi-linear form gi(xi, ti)− pi,4 where her (one-
dimensional) type ti ∈ [0, 1] is her private information.5 The gross payoff
function gi : [0, 1]× [0, 1]→ R satisfies two regularity conditions: the type
derivative gi2 exists, and it is bounded.6 Preferences are strictly single-crossing
in the sense that gi2(·, ti) is strictly increasing.
The leading example is a single-unit auction, in which physical outcomes
are probabilities of obtaining the good. It is commonly assumed that gross
payoffs have the product form gi(xi, ti) = xiti.
A direct mechanism is a map (X,P ) : [0, 1]n → [0, 1]n×Rn specifying an
outcome Xi(ti, t−i) and a payment P i(ti, t−i) for each type ti ∈ [0, 1] of each
agent i, given the (reported) types t−i of the other agents. (X,P ) is weakly
3Nothing changes if xi lies in some compact and convex subset X i of R.
4Quasi-linearity is not essential for our results, but greatly simplifies the arguments.
5Again, nothing changes if ti lies in some compact and convex subset T i of R.
6Boundedness can be weakened to the following: gi(xi, ·) is absolutely continuous for
each xi, and ti 7→ supxi∈[0,1] gi2(xi, ti) is dominated by an integrable function.
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Strict strategy-proofness obviously implies weak strategy-proofness.
By a standard revelation principle, any allocation rule (X,P ) that can be
achieved as a weak (strict) dominant-strategy equilibrium of some mechanism
must be weakly (strictly) strategy-proof. It is therefore without loss of
generality to focus on weakly (strictly) strategy-proof direct mechanisms.
The following characterisation of weak strategy-proofness is well-known:7
Spence–Mirrlees lemma. A direct mechanism (X,P ) is weakly strategy-
proof iff for each i and t−i, Xi(·, t−i) is weakly increasing and the envelope
formula is satisfied:
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3 A characterisation of strict strategy-proofness
For strict strategy-proofness, we have the following natural analogue.
Proposition 1. A direct mechanism (X,P ) is strictly strategy-proof iff for
each i and t−i, Xi(·, t−i) is strictly increasing and the envelope formula is
satisfied:
P i
(
ti, t−i
)
= P i
(
0, t−i
)
− gi
(
Xi
(
0, t−i
)
, 0
)
+ gi
(
Xi
(
ti, t−i
)
, ti
)
−
∫ ti
0
gi2
(
Xi
(
s, t−i
)
, s
)
ds for all ti ∈ [0, 1]. (B)
The proof hews closely to a standard proof of the Spence–Mirrlees lemma.
Proof. Begin with an observation: if the envelope formula (B) holds, then
the payoff loss of type ti of agent i from mimicking type ri, when the other
7See e.g. Jehle and Reny (2011, Theorem 9.5). For this result, it suffices that preferences
be weakly single-crossing in the sense that gi2(·, ti) is weakly increasing.
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The final step used Lebesgue’s fundamental theorem of calculus, which is
applicable since gi2 is bounded.
Suppose that (X,P ) is strictly strategy-proof. Then it is weakly strategy-
proof. Fix an i and a t−i. Since gi2 is bounded, the envelope theorem of
Milgrom and Segal (2002, Theorem 2) applies; hence the envelope formula
(B) must hold. Payoff losses from mimicking are therefore given by (?). By
strict strategy-proofness, (?) is strictly positive for any ri 6= ti. Since gi2(·, s)
is strictly increasing, this is only possible if Xi(·, t−i) is strictly increasing.8
Suppose that (X,P ) is such that for each i and t−i, Xi(·, t−i) is strictly
increasing and the envelope formula (B) holds. Then payoff losses from
mimicking are given by (?). By inspection, (?) is strictly positive for any
ri 6= ti since gi2(·, s) and Xi(·, t−i) are strictly increasing; hence (X,P ) is
strictly strategy-proof. 
Remark 1. Suppose that each agent i has a (type-independent) outside
option worth wi. Then strict strategy-proofness plus (interim) individual
rationality are equivalent to strict monotonicity, the envelope formula (B),
and gi(Xi(0, t−i), 0)− P i(0, t−i) ≥ wi for each i and t−i.
8In detail: consider ti > ri (the case ti < ri is analogous), and suppose toward a
contradiction that Xi(ti, t−i) ≤ Xi(ri, t−i). Since gi2(·, s) is strictly increasing, we have∫ ti
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So it cannot be that both terms on the left-hand side are strictly positive. By (?), this
contradicts the hypothesis that ti strictly prefers not to mimic ri and vice-versa.
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4 Strictness is essentially for free
Since any weakly increasing function is close to strictly increasing functions,
Proposition 1 allows us to conclude that weak strategy-proofness can be
made strict by an arbitrarily small modification.
We require a pair of additional assumptions: for each i, the gross pay-
off gi(·, ti) is continuous for each ti, and the family of type derivatives
{gi2(·, ti)}ti∈[0,1] is equi-continuous.9,10 These assumptions are weak and typ-
ically satisfied in applications; for example, they hold for the gross payoff
gi(xi, ti) = xiti commonly used in auctions.
Let X ⊆ [0, 1]n be the set of feasible physical outcomes, and call a
mechanism (X,P ) feasible iff X(t) is feasible for every t ∈ [0, 1]n. For
concreteness, assume that the feasible set is
X =
{(
x1, . . . , xn
)
∈ [0, 1]n :
n∑
i=1
xi ≤ 1
}
,
which in the auction interpretation means that the good cannot be assigned
with total probability exceeding unity. The argument below applies unchanged
if the good must be assigned (∑ni=1 xi = 1), or if there are no constraints
(X = [0, 1]n). Analogous arguments can be made for other constraints.
Proposition 2. If a feasible direct mechanism (X,P ) is weakly strategy-
proof, then for any ε > 0, there is a feasible and strictly strategy-proof direct
mechanism that is uniformly ε-close to (X,P ).11
In the language of the virtual implementation literature (e.g. Abreu and
Sen (1991), Abreu and Matsushima (1992)), Proposition 2 says that every
feasible and weakly strategy-proof direct mechanism is virtually strictly
strategy-proof. Weak strategy-proofness therefore ‘essentially’ shares the
robustness properties of strict strategy-proofness; in particular, an arbitrarily
small modification suffices to achieve full implementation.
Proof. Let (X,P ) be feasible and weakly strategy-proof. We shall construct
a feasible and strictly strategy-proof direct mechanism in terms of δ > 0,
then show that we can make it uniformly ε-close to (X,P ) by choosing δ.
9{gi2(·, ti)}ti∈[0,1] is equi-continuous iff for any ε > 0, there is a δ > 0 such that
|xi′ − xi| < δ implies that |gi2(xi′, ti)− gi2(xi, ti)| < ε for every ti ∈ [0, 1].
10Continuity of gi(·, ti) for all ti may be weakened to continuity of gi(·, 0) only. But given
the equi-continuity assumption, the latter implies the former, for gi(·, ti) equals gi(·, 0)
plus a continuous integral (using Lebesgue’s fundamental theorem of calculus).
11That is: for every i, ti and t−i, Xi(ti, t−i) and P i(ti, t−i) change by at most ε.
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For δ > 0, define a direct mechanism (Xδ, Pδ) as follows. For each i,
Xiδ
(
ti, t−i
)
:= δ t
i∑n
j=1 t
j
+ (1− δ)Xi
(
ti, t−i
)
.12
In the auction interpretation, this physical allocation rule assigns the good
according to X with probability 1 − δ, and with probability δ assigns it
randomly with probabilities proportional to agents’ types. This allocation
rule is feasible since X is:
n∑
i=1
Xiδ
(
ti, t−i
)
= δ + (1− δ)
n∑
i=1
Xi
(
ti, t−i
)
≤ 1.
Since (X,P ) is weakly strategy-proof, Xi(·, t−i) is weakly increasing by the
Spence–Mirrlees lemma; hence Xiδ(·, t−i) is strictly increasing.
Define the payments to satisfy the envelope formula (B):
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Since strict monotonicity and the envelope formula hold, (Xδ, Pδ) is strictly
strategy-proof (for any δ > 0) by Proposition 1.
For every i, ti and t−i, we have
∣∣∣Xiδ (ti, t−i)−Xi (ti, t−i)∣∣∣ = δ
∣∣∣∣∣ ti∑n
j=1 t
j
−Xi
(
ti, t−i
)∣∣∣∣∣.
Since Xi maps into [0, 1], this expression is bounded by δ, so Xiδ is uniformly
δ-close to Xi.
Since (X,P ) is weakly strategy-proof, it satisfies (B) by the Spence–
12When the first term is 0/0, it is to be understood as 1/n.
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Mirrlees lemma. Therefore, for every i, ti and t−i,∣∣∣P iδ (ti, t−i)− P i (ti, t−i)∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣− [gi (Xiδ (0, t−i) , 0)− gi (Xi (0, t−i) , 0)]
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≤
∣∣∣gi (Xiδ (0, t−i) , 0)− gi (Xi (0, t−i) , 0)∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣gi (Xiδ (ti, t−i) , 0)− gi (Xi (ti, t−i) , 0)∣∣∣
+
∫ ti
0
∣∣∣gi2 (Xiδ (ti, t−i) , s)− gi2 (Xi (ti, t−i) , s)∣∣∣ds
+
∫ ti
0
∣∣∣gi2 (Xiδ (s, t−i) , s)− gi2 (Xi (s, t−i) , s)∣∣∣ds, (M)
where we used Lebesgue’s fundamental theorem of calculus.
Now, fix ε > 0. Further fix an agent i. Since gi(·, 0) is continuous,
{gi2(·, s)}s∈[0,1] is equi-continuous, and Xiδ is uniformly δ-close to Xi for any
δ > 0, we may choose δi > 0 sufficiently small that the first two terms and
the two integrands in (M) are all < ε/4 for any ti and t−i. Then∣∣∣P iδi (ti, t−i)− P i (ti, t−i)∣∣∣ < ε/4 + ε/4 + ∫ ti0 ε/4 +
∫ ti
0
ε/4 ≤ ε
for all ti and t−i, which is to say that P iδi is uniformly ε-close to P
i.
Let δ := min{ε, δ1, . . . , δn}. Then for each i, Xiδ is uniformly ε-close to
Xi, and P iδ is uniformly ε-close to P i. 
An implication of Proposition 2 is that a principal can make strategy-
proofness strict at essentially no cost. Let X × P = [0, 1][0,1] ×R[0,1] denote
the set of all direct mechanisms.
Corollary 1. Let (X,P ) be weakly strategy-proof, and let Π : X ×P → R
be a continuous function.13 Then for any ε > 0, there is a strictly strategy-
proof direct mechanism with value at least Π(X,P )− ε.
13Continuity in the uniform topology is enough.
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The principal’s objective function is typically continuous in applications.
It often has the form
Π(X,P ) =
∫
[0,1]n
[
n∑
i=1
pi
(
Xi(t), P i(t), ti
)]
F (dt) ,
where F is the principal’s belief about how types are distributed. Π is
continuous for revenue-maximisation (pi(x, p, t) = p), efficiency-maximisation
(pi(x, p, t) = xt), and welfare-maximisation (pi(x, p, t) = xt− p).
5 Related literature
To our knowledge, strict strategy-proofness has appeared previously only
in Bergemann and Morris (2009). These authors characterise ‘robust’ im-
plementability by a direct mechanism in terms of strict ex-post incentive-
compatibility (strict EPIC), which is equivalent to strict strategy-proofness
in a private-values environment such as ours. In §7, they consider an auction
environment, and construct (in the same way as in the proof of Proposition 2)
a strictly EPIC mechanism close to an efficient mechanism. Proposition 2
shows that with private values, this can be done for any weakly strategy-proof
mechanism, not only efficient ones. Bergemann and Morris (2009) do not
characterise strict strategy-proofness, so have no analogue of Proposition 1.
As mentioned in §4, Proposition 2 may be viewed as contributing to the
virtual implementation literature (e.g. Abreu and Sen (1991), Abreu and
Matsushima (1992)). This literature does not appear to have considered
‘strict’ versions of incentive-compatibility.
More tangentially related are the literatures on undominated implementa-
tion (e.g. Jackson (1992)) and rationalisable implementation (e.g. Bergemann,
Morris and Tercieux (2011)). The former requires that agents’ strategies
not be weakly dominated; the latter that they not be iteratively strictly
dominated. By contrast, we require agents’ strategies to be strictly dominant.
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